September 14, 2023

Week 3 Notes

<u>Plan</u>:

1. Preliminaries.

Three distinctions:

a) "The notorious 'ing'/'ed' ('able') distinction."
b) Particulars/facts (referrable to by singular terms vs. statable by declarative sentences).
c) Epistemic-justificatory (normative) vs. causal-dispositional (alethic modal).

2. Givenness (a myth).

a) An inconsistent triad.
b) Diagnosis: Running together two good lines of thought.
c) Diagram:
Visible world→Sensings of Sense Contents→Noninferential Beliefs→Inferential Beliefs
d) Givenness in general: The idea that there can be any state or episode that has epistemic evidential or justificatory significance that does not presuppose conceptual capacities that come only with language.

3. Appearance/Reality ('looks Φ'-talk and 'is Φ'-talk).

a) Descartes's reifying and epistemological privileging appearances (appearings).
b) Parable of the tie shop, and its lesson about what one is *doing* in saying how things merely look: withholding endorsement.
c) Two confirmations of Sellars's account: merely generic lookings (many-sided) and scoped lookings.
d) Epistemological lesson: 'looks Φ'-talk is pragmatically, and so semantically dependent on (presupposes) 'is Φ'-talk. Conclusion: knowledge of appearances cannot serve as an epistemological foundation (regress-stopper w/res to justification).
e) From perception to agency: analogical argument for language-exit transitions and volitions as minimal safe doings.

4. Epistemology of observation reports. The role of reliability.

a) Sellars's justificatory internalism. Must not only *be* reliable, but *know* that one is.
b) Reliabilism as justificatory externalism. Reliability is enough for justification.
c) A social *via media*. Attributor of knowledge endorses reliability inference.

5. Acquiring concepts. Coming into the language.

a) Paradox of sapient awareness presupposing concept-acquisition, not explaining it.
b) Social functionalism.

Part 1:

Three distinctions:

a) "The notorious 'ing'/'ed' ('able') distinction."
b) Particulars/facts (referrable by singular terms vs. statable by declarative sentences).
c) Epistemic-justificatory (normative) vs. causal-dispositional (alethic modal).

1. Preliminary assembling of distinctions and resulting tensions:

First section is titled "An *Ambiguity* in Sense-Datum Theories"
Begins with **three** important **distinctions:**
I want to tell a story about each, sometimes (first two) involving an explanatory (so, conceptual) priority claim.

a) "The notorious '**ing**'/'**ed**' ambiguity,"

for "sensation"—but also such other philosophically important concepts as:
"judgment," "belief", "knowledge," "intention," "justification," "experience," "perception," "action," "evaluation," ….
Acts of sens*ing* vs. contents sens*ed*.

For intentional terms ('belief', 'justification'…) these correspond to the topics of pragmatic and semantic MVs.
Consider a claim such as: "There is nothing in knowledge that is not there first in experience."
It matters a *lot* whether one understands 'experience' to mean 'experiencings' or 'what is experienced'.
Berkeleyan idealism crucially depends on running these two together.
There is a big difference between saying:

- "What is real can be experienc*ed*," and
- "What is real is experienc*ings*."

When Frege says "a fact is a thought that is true" he does *not* mean "a fact is a thinking that is true." There are not enough acts of thinking for that to be right. He means 'thought' in the sense of what *can be* thought: 'thought' in the sense of '*thinkable*' content.

Note functionalism-pragmatism about the explanatory-conceptual relations between *intentional* 'ings' and 'eds'.
Not clear what the converse strategy is.
Pragmatism, starting with Kant, is functionalism about content.
This understanding 'ed' in terms of 'ing': what is judged (a content) in terms of what one is doing in terms of judging.
Semantics (content, meaning) in terms of pragmatics (doing, use). Is this a special case? (See below.)

(This is only for intentionally contentful doings.
Why?
Is that a criterion of demarcation of the intentionally contentful?
If so, why?)

Maybe this is not right.
Maybe pragmatism is functionalism about *everything* that takes the ing/ed distinction.
The thing done in terms of the doing of it. The dance in terms of the dancing. The leap in terms of the leaping.
But we do *not* want to insist on this for all *relational* predicates, I think: admired-admirable in terms of admiring is OK, but kicked in terms of kicking, borrowed in terms of borrowing, measured in terms of measuring, illuminated in terms of illuminating…
There is a *de dicto/de re* issue here. *Qua* illuminated, we need to understand what is illuminated in terms of the illuminating of it. But what is illuminated might just be a rock, which does not depend on being illuminated to be what it is.

Gerunds form nouns from verbs.
Pragmatism as radically generalizing this: all 'ed' nouns are gerunds.
This is the polar opposite of nominalism.
It shares an impulse and motivation with nominalization nominalism.
The perceived in terms of the perceiving of it. One could claim that is the Gibsonian revolution: the conception of affordances.

This issue will come up later, about norms.
Value (valuables, valueds) in terms of valuings is common to utilitarians and Nietzsche.
As dependence of normative statuses on normative attitudes (toward those statuses), it is *modernity*, in Hegel's terms.
Sellars sees it as an appropriate kind of nonrealism about norms.

b) **Facts** vs. **particulars**. §3.

What is *expressed by declarative sentences* vs. what is *referred to by singular terms*.
Note that using *one* notion of <u>representation</u> for both of these is already to undertake nontrivial commitments that might be hard to walk back later.

If one begins with what Dummett calls "the name/bearer model" of representation (de Saussure's "signifier/signified"), if one takes as one's semantic paradigm and either primitive or the first thing to be explained the relation between: 'Bowser', the name and Bowser the dog, then one faces important choices:

i. Should one understand the semantic relationship between the sentence "Bowser is a dog," and something else (a fact or state of affairs) on that same model of *naming* or *designating*?
ii. Or should one aim to build up the semantic interpretant of the declarative sentence from parts one understands on that model? That will lead to understanding predicates

as naming or designating (one philosopher's term in the vicinity is 'denoting') properties or relations, now thought of as a kind of thing.
Then one has the Bradley problem of how to "stick together" these different kinds of things to get something *claimable*, *believable*, something that could be *true*.
Sellars will go through these considerations carefully in his discussion of 'exemplification' in connection with universals as paradigmatic abstract objects.
De Saussure and structuralism, downstream from him have this problem.
Also Derridean post-structuralism, downstream from that, where Derrida can only see how to reject understanding semantics in terms of the Saussurian signifier/signified relation by claiming that signifiers refer only to other signifiers.
(It is not that there is nothing to such a line of thought. Sellars's semantics of "meaning as functional classification" is "horizontal", relating languagings to in the first place to other languagings, rather than "directly" to the world. But there are serious criteria of adequacy to be satisfied in constructing such an account.)

From our point of view, such approaches are pre-Kantian, in not appreciating the semantic "primacy of the proposition," derived from its pragmatic primacy, that led Kant to treat *judgments* as the minimal unit of apperceptive awareness—and kicked off his pragmatist understanding of judgeables in terms of judgings, what one is doing in judging (namely, committing oneself to rationally integrating the judgeable into a constellation of commitments having the distinctive systematic unity characteristic of apperception—the "transcendental unity of apperception" that is 'transcendental' in that it is a condition of valid reference to objects).

On the other side, if one starts with declarative sentences *stating* or *expressing* facts or states of affairs, something that is *not* initially happily thought of in terms of 'representing', as inferentialists do, there are two at least roughly corresponding questions:

iii. Strawson's complaint about Austin's use of a notion of <u>fact</u> as in the grip of a theory that leads him to introduce "sentence-shaped objects."

But notice, that this complaint simply *presupposes* that the world is a collection of *objects*, particulars, so that "sentence-shaped" bits of the *world* must be a kind of *object*—in which case, they would indeed be a *peculiar* kind.
In fact, though he does countenance "states of affairs," which is what Strawson complains about, Austin's view is more nuanced (nuance being his speciality, really):

> " Fact that " is a phrase designed for use in situations where the distinction between a true statement and the state of affairs about which it is a truth is neglected ; as it often is with advantage in ordinary life, though seldom in philosophy—above all in discussing truth, where it is precisely our business to prise the words off the world and keep them off it. To ask " Is the fact that S the true statement that S or that which it is true of ? " may beget absurd answers. To take an analogy : although we may sensibly ask " Do we *ride* the word ' elephant ' or the animal ? " and equally sensibly " Do we *write* the word or the animal ? " it is nonsense to ask " Do we *define* the word or the animal ? " For defining an elephant (supposing we ever do this) is a compendious description of an operation involving both word and animal (do we focus the image or the battleship ?) ; and so speaking about " the fact that " is a compendious way of speaking about a situation involving both words and world.[14]

iv. One must have something to say about how *naming* relates to this sense of *saying*. In fact one of Sellars's essays that we'll be reading for week 6 is called "Naming and Saying".

This issue is behind the Tractarian world-of-facts vs. nominalist world-of-particulars metaphysical issue. One way or another, that *ontological* issue is at least entangled with (if nor reducible to) a *semantic* issue—at least about how the two sides of the language-world semantic-intentional nexus are related in this fundamental structural respect.

§3: "The sense-datum theorist, it would seem, must choose between saying:

a. It is ***particulars*** which are sensed. Sensing is not knowing. The existence of sense data does not *logically* imply the existence of knowledge.

or

b. Sensing *is* a form of knowing. It is ***facts*** rather than *particulars* which are sensed."

Relation between distinctions (1) ing/ed (able) and (2) particular/fact is that sens*ings* (know*ings*, believ*ings*) can be particulars, even if what is sens*ed* (known, believed) is a fact or statable.
So resolving the question from §3 just above might turn on understanding the pragmatic/semantic ing/ed(able) nexus.

Note that Sellars assumes that causation is a relation between *particulars*, not *facts*.
The argument above does not turn on this assumption, but one might contest it.

c) **Epistemic**/Non-epistemic. §5 This normative/matter-of-factual. Cf. §36. Picked up in the "mongrel crossbreeding" characterization in §7.

This is the Kantian distinction.
Later on, I will talk about how to *distinguish* normative vocabulary (and so, concepts).

I do this in an inferentialist way, in terms of their involvement in *practical* inferences.

i. This is to be my reading of Sellars's talk about rules as *lived* in the lives of participants.

ii. It is also the basis of my response to Ryan Simonelli's discerning of a *third* sort of relevant modality, *agentives*, in addition to *alethic* and *deontic* modals.
For I want to claim that the normative vocabulary is already agentive, in virtue of the essential involvement of **deliberative practical reasoning** in it.
Of course, it also involves **assessing practical reasoning**, which is *not* (in the same way) agentive. So the claim is that Ryan is focusing on *one* of the two social perspectives essential to practical reasoning, and that my notion of the normative includes *both*.

d) Issue of relation of *sensory givenness* to **learning** or **acquisition** (of **concepts**).
This issues in:

Part 2:

a) An inconsistent triad:

§6:
It is clear…that *classical* sense-datum theories…are confronted by an **inconsistent triad** made up of the following three propositions:

A. *x senses red sense content s* entails *x non-inferentially knows that s is red*.
B. The ability to sense sense contents is unacquired.
C. The ability to know facts of the form *x is ø* is acquired.

Brief detour:
On materially inconsistent triads:

- This sample is a blackberry.
- This sample is red.
- This sample is ripe.

Any two of these are OK.
Irreducibly triadic *material* incompatibility. ("Blackberries are red when they are green.")

Can mention "Sellars challenge" and the comparison of *conceptual* irreducible incompatible triads vs. *perceptual* ones.
Find three foods or drinks, such that any two of them are good together, but the triad is horrible.
Candidate: beer, whisky, lemonade.

- Beer and whisky is a boilermaker.
- Whisky and lemonade is a whisky sour.
- Beer and lemonade is a shandy.

The three of them are, if not horrible together, not something people voluntarily drink.

But this challenge is for amusement only unless the difficulty of finding perceptual examples and the ubiquity of conceptual ones teaches us something about concepts and perception.
Is there some lesson from the apparent difference in conceptual/perceptual structure?

Once the classical sense-datum theorist faces up to the fact that A, B, and C do form an inconsistent triad, which of them will he choose to abandon?

1. He can abandon A, in which case the sensing of sense contents becomes a noncognitive fact -- a noncognitive fact, to be sure which may be a necessary condition, even a *logically* necessary condition, of non-inferential knowledge, but a fact, nevertheless, which cannot *constitute* this knowledge.

2. He can abandon B, in which case he must pay the price of cutting off the concept of a sense datum from its connection with our ordinary talk about sensations, feelings, afterimages, tickles and itches, etc., which are usually thought by sense-datum theorists to be its common sense counterparts.
3. But to abandon C is to do violence to the predominantly nominalistic proclivities of the empiricist tradition.

b) <u>Diagnosis</u>:

§7: Mongrelization of two lines of thought. One is causal-physiological, the other evidential-justificatory. Kant on "the celebrated Mr. Locke"s "mere physiology of understanding." The Kantian distinction between *quid factis* and *quid juris*. That it must not become a dualism. This is one of Sellars's principal conceptual tools.

7. "It certainly begins to look as though the classical concept of a sense datum were a mongrel resulting from a crossbreeding of two ideas:

1. The idea that there are certain inner episodes -- e.g. sensations of red or C# which can occur to human beings (and brutes) **without any prior process of learning or concept formation**; and without which it would *in some sense* be impossible to *see*, for example, that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular, or *hear* that a certain physical sound is C#.
2. The idea that there are certain inner episodes which are non-inferential knowings that certain items are, for example, red or C#; and that these episodes are the necessary conditions of empirical knowledge as **providing the evidence for all other empirical propositions.**"

c) <u>Diagram</u>:

Physical World
|
1
↓
Sensings of Sense Contents
|
2
↓
Noninferential Beliefs
|
3
↓
Inferential Beliefs

In the standard perceptual case:

- It is *because* there is a red object with an octagonal facing surface in front of me that I find myself with a sensing of a red-and-octagonal sense content.
- It is *because* I have such a sense content that I acquire the noninferential belief that there is a red and octagonal object in front of me.
- And it is *because* I have this belief, together, perhaps, with other beliefs, that I am justified in the further inferential belief that there is stop sign in front of me.

There are *two* questions here, corresponding to the last two of the three distinctions (particulars/facts and nonepistemic/epistemic):

a) Is "because (2) epistemic-justificatory or nonepistemic-causal?
   Of course, one might want to explore the possibilities that
   i) these distinctions are not exhaustive or
   ii) these distinctions are not exclusive.
b) Beliefs are on the sentential-structured side.
   What about "physical objects" and "sensings of sense contents"?
   i) Is it the visible *fact that* there is a red octagonal object (sentential-factual structure) or the octagonal red object (term-particular structure) that stands in causal relations with sensings?
   ii) And is the sensing a particular, or is it the *fact that* the subject senses a sense content that is caused by the environing fact-or-particular?
   iii) Then what about the because-relation (2) on the particular/fact dimension? Does it link a particular sensing with a sentential belief? It seems that must not be justificatory, but could be causal.

The issues raised by the two distinctions seem linked, in that it seems that *justificatory* relations must be between sentence-like items. For these are *reason* relations, paradigmatically *inferential* relations.

We are drilling down on the details of the interface between the causal order and the conceptual order. The latter is normative and essentially inferential, since it is the order of reasons.
Here there seem to be two options:

A) Sensings are particulars, both caused by particulars and causing particular (noninferential, perceptual) believ*ings* (first distinction). Those noninferential believings can then inferentially justify, via their sentential conceptual contents, other believings. The issue is how one thing, a noninferential believ*ing*, can also have a believ*ed* content, which is sentential and conceptual, can serve as a premise in inferences. Here we might go

functionalist-pragmatist, looking at the situation of believings of this (sentential) *type* in a "space of implications." This is Sellars's view (I claim).

B) Sensings of sense contents are particulars ("perceptual experiences") with *judgeable*, *believable* propositional contents, but not yet judg*ings* or believ*ings*. They are already *justified* by the visible *facts* that typically (when all goes well) *cause* them to occur, that is, cause the *fact that* those sensings ("perceptual experiences") occur. "The conceptual has no outer boundary." This is McDowell's view in *Mind and World*.

In Week 4 I will pick up this opposition (between Sellars as I understand him and McD in *MW*) when (as the next move), I articulate the two-ply account of observation ("Bobservation"). In particular, mention as a result (or maybe just a symptom) of the disagreement between (A) and (B), the two ways of thinking about the sense in which "noninferential beliefs" (which we *all*—Sellars, me, and John—agree are *not* "noninferential" in the sense that their conceptual-propositional *content* is intelligible apart from their "location in a space of implications": their situation in an *inferentially articulated* network of claimable-believable contents). These are

a) noninferentially elicited states or episodes (me, Sellars)
b) states or episodes that admit of a distinctive kind of *justification* by invoking their status as *seeings*.

Here we can also look forward to Part 4 of this discussion, on epistemology.

So what I really want here is an account of
how the three distinctions interdigitate in the diagram.
Interactions are:
Believ*ings* are *particular* events or states (and kinds of them).
What is believ*ed*, conceptual-propositional contents, are sentence-like, and can stand in inferential relations.
In virtue of having contents, believ*ings* can be thought of as standing in inferential relations at one remove.
In this sense, believ*ings* "live two lives": as particulars, in the causal order and, in virtue of being conceptually contentful, normative, epistemic, cognitive sentence-like.
The relations between them are to be understood *functionally*, in a *pragmatist* way, in which *semantic* contentfulness is understood in terms of *pragmatic norms* (*uses* of sentences, specified in a *normative* pragmatic metavocabulary).

- ing/ed (really, ing/able) in relation to particular/fact:

Believing/believable is a particular to sentential-statable relation.
Dance/danceable is a particular to particular relation.
(Both admit sortal kinds of particulars: a particular danceable kind, such as… [ballet or modern example].

The question here is whether "sensing of a sense content" in the diagram is reporting a particular/particular or particular/truth-evaluable episode.

The norm/cause or justification/disposition third dimension matters mainly for **the becausation arrows**. But that is enough to show the flaw in this version of sensory givenness.

The second distinction is what one can refer to and what one can state (express with a singular term/sortal term or with a declarative sentence).

The overall question is about the understanding the transition from the nonconceptual to the conceptual.
This is Sellars's version. McD insists that it is in the first instance statables, facts or states of affairs, that are perceived/perceivable, and that they can justify, provide reasons for, perceivables (whether perceived or not).

Inferentialist principle: what is conceptually contentful is what can stand in inferential relations.
Must state this principle carefully, in terms of ings and ables:
Ables are conceptual contents (unlike danceables or leaps) in case they can imply one another.
Then ings of those ables can stand in justificatory relations to one another.

Inferentialist principle relates ontological kind (particular-referable/statable) to epistemic/nonepistemic, which includes both normative and statability. Is the principle that only statables can stand in normative relations? No. Tickets, licenses…. But **justificatory relations hold only between statables** (and, whichever way the explanatory order goes, statings of them)]: If the '-ed' or '-able' is a statable ('statement': stating/stated-statable) rather than a referable, then it is conceptual, can serve as a premise, and can be normatively related by justificatory relations to other statables, including those that are the contents of believings (noninferential and inferential).

So, two principles:
If the eds-ables are sentential-statable, they must be inferentially-implicationally related to other such eds-ables.
To stand in normative justificatory relations, items must be eds-ables that are sentential-statable, not term-referable.

There are, according to these two principles, two boundaries that need to be crossed to move from the nonconceptual world (not on McD's conception) and conceptual candidate knowings:
Need to get to i) statables that can ii) stand in normative, justificatory relations to others.
The claim is that both statability and being 'epistemic' in being able to stand in justificatory relations must be acquired abilities.

Q: How does atomism/holism fit in here?

A: Conceptuality requires holistic inferential-implicational relations to other conceptual items. This requires sentential-statable structure. It makes possible normative justificatory relations.

d) Givenness in general:

Givenness generally.
Everything turns on enforcing Kant's distinction between the order of causes and the order of justification (facts and norms). Critique of the MoG is just an application of this basic Kantian point.

- **Two senses of "noninferential**."

Mention McDowell's alternate reading of my "noninferentially elicited judging" with judgings that would be justified by appeal to one's having seen.
Note distinction between this and invocation of one's reliability.
Consequence for part 2 (after "looks"):
Two senses in which knowledge could have a foundation: justificatory/epistemological and semantic. It does not have a *semantic* foundation, and in particular, observation statements are not a *semantic* foundation.

- The Myth of the Given is at root the idea that there can be something such that just by *having* it, one counts as *knowing* something.

Digging down a little, it is the idea that justification could bottom out in something *nonconceptual*, in the sense of episodes one could have *without* having had to acquire a whole battery of concepts.

Even deeper, it uses semantic holism—the idea that in order to have *one* concept one must have a whole *lot* of interrelated concepts—to undercut the intelligibility of the idea of an epistemological foundation. There cannot be an *epistemological* foundation because there cannot be a *semantic* foundation.

"The light dawns gradually over the whole." [*On Certainty*, §141]

- Conceptual contentfulness and being able to serve as evidence. To be evidence, it must be able to serve as a premise in inferences, so must be "situated in a space of implications."

- Givenness as idea of something with potential evidential significance that does not require any prior process of concept acquisition.

Part 3: Appearance/Reality ('looks Φ'-talk and 'is Φ'-talk).

a) Descartes's reification and epistemological privileging of appearances (appearings).

Begin with Descartes:
He famously read his ontology off of his epistemology.
In this regard, he belongs in a methodological box with Plato.
In Plato's case, the big ontological distinction, between the realm of Becoming and the realm of Being, was between **things that are known by the *senses*** and **things that are known by the *intellect***.
In Descartes's case, the big ontological distinction, between material things and thoughts (*pensées*)—the physical and the mental—was between **represent*eds*** and **represent*ings*** ('ing'/'ed'):
things that can only be known *representationally*, by representing them, and **things that are known *immediately***, not by the knower *representing* them, but by their mere *occurrence* in the mind of the knower.
Semantically, where representing and represented are distinct, there is always the possibility of *mis*representation, error, where the appearance in representings misleads about the reality represented.
In the case of representings (or where represented and representing coincide), there is no such possibility.

The datum addressed by all this high theory is this:
The "seems" or "appears" operator **does not iterate**.
There *is* a substantial difference between
S is Φ and S seems or appears to be Φ.
One can be true and the other false.
But there is *not* the same sort of difference between
S seems or appears to be Φ and S seems to seem, or appears to appear, to be Φ.

Descartes' idea: there are things, **appearings**, about which we cannot be mistaken.

I mentioned last time that the Agrippan trilemma, whose home is in *epistemological* investigations of justification relations, has a *semantic* analogue for representation relations.
If we know things by representing them, how do we know the representings themselves?
It seems there must either be an infinite regress of representings of representings of representings…, or a representational circle, or some way of knowing representings that is not representational, but immediate.
Those semantic regress-stoppers are *mental* representings, the representings in our minds.
Put another way, (external, material) *Reality* can be known by being represent*ed*.
The represent*ings* of it are its *Appearance* to the mind.

We can be mistaken about reality, if it is not in fact as it appears to us, not as we represent it to be.
But we cannot be mistaken (at least not in the same way) about how it appears to us.
Maybe the tower in the distance that appears round is really square (a favorite 17th century example). Then we might be mistaken about its real shape. But we could not be mistaken about how it *appears*. What would it be for it only to *appear* to appear round?
The possibility of error applies only to the represent*ed* real, not to the represent*ing* appearance of it.
The distinction between reality and its mere appearance that makes intelligible the possibility of erroneous appearances does not iterate. It does not apply to the representing appearings.

On the representational semantic model, if there is anything we can be wrong about, by *mis*reprepresenting it, then there must be something we can*not* be wrong about, namely our own representings.
Representational semantics accordingly implicitly contains within it an epistemological foundation: a class of regress-stoppers with respect to justification.
That is our knowledge of how things appear or seem to us, our representings.
We are guaranteed to be incorrigible about Appearings, even though we are fallible about Reality.

Thus is born an epistemological program:
Derive or reconstruct our claims about material reality solely in terms of claims about how things appear to us, so as to be able to justify claims in ordinary empirical descriptive vocabulary (about billiard balls and lions) in terms of phenomenal vocabulary that refers only to how things look, seem, or appear to us: how we represent it to be, our representings.

This was a brilliant train of philosophical thought.

It is also dead wrong, wrong root and branch—and Sellars shows that it is and how it is and why it is.

It depends on a complete misunderstanding of the relations between what is expressed by talk about how things really are and how they merely look or appear.
But the misunderstanding is a *deep* one, not a dimwitted one.

b) Parable of the tie shop, and its lesson about what one is *doing* in saying how things merely look: withholding endorsement.

Walk through the discussion of John in the tie shop (passages from §14 through §22), and how "looks" -Φ-talk can arise out of "is"-Φ talk.

14. To bring out the essential features of the use of "looks," I shall engage in a little historical fiction. A young man, whom I shall call John, works in a necktie shop. He has learned the use of color words in the usual way, with this exception. I shall suppose that he has never looked at an object in other than standard conditions. As he examines his stock every evening before closing up shop, he says, "This is red," "That is green," "This is purple," etc., and such of his linguistic peers as happen to be present nod their heads approvingly.

Let us suppose, now, that at this point in the story, electric lighting is invented. His friends and neighbors rapidly adopt this new means of illumination, and wrestle with the problems it presents. John, however, is the last to succumb. Just after it has been installed in his shop, one of his neighbors, Jim, comes in to buy a necktie.

"Here is a handsome green one," says John.

"But it *isn't* green," says Jim, and takes John outside.

"Well," says John, "it was green in there, but now it is blue."

"No," says Jim, "you know that neckties don't change their color merely as a result of being taken from place to place."

"But perhaps electricity changes their color and they change back again in daylight?"

"That would be a queer kind of change, wouldn't it?" says Jim.

"I suppose so," says bewildered John. "But we *saw* that it was green *in there*."

No, we didn't see that it was green in there, because it wasn't green, and you can't see what isn't so!"

"Well, this is a pretty pickle," says John. "*I just don't know what to say*."

The next time John picks up this tie in his shop and someone asks what color it is, his first impulse is to say "It is green." He suppresses this impulse, and remembering what happened before, comes out with "It is blue." He doesn't *see* that it is blue, nor would he say that he sees it to be blue. What does he see? Let us ask him.

I don't know *what* to say. If I didn't know that the tie is blue -- and the alternative to granting this is odd indeed -- I would swear that I was seeing a green tie and seeing that it is green. It is *as though* I were seeing the necktie to be green."

If we bear in mind that such **sentences as "This is green" have both a *fact-stating* and a *reporting* use,** we can put the point I have just been making by saying that once John learns to stifle the *report* "This necktie is green" when looking at it in the shop, there is no other *report* about color and the necktie which he knows how to make. To be sure, he now says "This necktie is blue." But he is not making a *reporting* use of this sentence. He uses it as the conclusion of an inference.

15. We return to the shop after an interval, and we find that when John is asked "What is the color of this necktie?" he makes such statements as "It looks green, but take it outside and see." It occurs to us that perhaps in learning to say "This tie *looks* green" when in the shop, he has learned to make a new kind of report. Thus, it might seem as though his linguistic peers have helped him to notice a new kind of *objective* fact, one which, though a relational fact involving a perceiver, is as logically independent of the beliefs, the conceptual framework of the perceiver, as the fact that the necktie is blue; but a *minimal* fact, one which it is safer to report because one is less likely to be mistaken. Such a minimal fact would be the fact that the necktie looks green to John on a certain occasion, and it would be properly reported by using the sentence "This necktie *looks* green." It is this type of account, of course, which I have already rejected.

But what is the alternative? If, that is, we are not going to adopt the sense-datum analysis. Let me begin by noting that there certainly seems to be something to the idea that the sentence "This looks green to me now" has a reporting role. Indeed, it would seem to be essentially a report. But if so, *what* does it report, if not a minimal objective fact, and if what it reports is not to be analyzed in terms of sense data?

16. Now the suggestion I wish to make is, in its simplest terms, that **the statement "X looks green to Jones" differs from "Jones sees that x is green" in that whereas the latter both ascribes a propositional claim to Jones' experience *and endorses it*, the former ascribes the claim but does not endorse it.** This is the essential difference between the two, for it is clear that two experiences may be identical *as experiences*, and yet one be properly referred to as a *seeing that* something is green, and the other *merely* as a case of something's *looking* green. Of course, if I say "X *merely looks* green to S" I am not only failing to endorse the claim, I am rejecting it.

Key here is idea that there are at least two dimensions to making noninferential reports:

a) RDRD. This is what we share with parrots. H. H. Price's "thermometer" view (cf. §35).
b) Endorsement.

Looks talk as withholding endorsement, but evincing RDRD.

c) Two confirmations of Sellars's account: merely generic lookings (manysided) and scoped lookings.

The function of 'looks' is endorsement withholding.

In saying that 'X looks Φ' I am doing two things:

1. **Evincing or manifesting my *disposition* to respond to the situation by claiming 'X *is* Φ'**
2. **Explicitly *resisting* that temptation and *withholding* my endorsement of the claim 'X is Φ'**

(Sellars mentions the third-personal, attributing use of 'looks' in the §16 passage above.)

How this explains:

i. merely generic lookings (speckled hen, merely many-sided polygon), and
ii. differently scoped lookings.

(i): From §9: Something can *look* polygonal without there being any determinate number of sides that it looks to have. But nothing can *be* polygonal without there being a determinate number of sides that it has.

So here the sense-datum inference fails. That is the insistence that if something external *seems* to be Φ, then there is something internal that really *is* Φ—the appearance.

But this is easily explained on Sellars account: one *endorses* the claim that the chiliagon is polygonal, and *withholds* all claims about exactly how many sides it has.

(ii) §17:

We begin to look for some confirmation of the two-pronged account of ‘looks’ talk as expressing a differential responsive disposition to make a specified noninferential report, while withholding endorsement of that claim. The confirmation takes the form of explanations of otherwise puzzling features of appearance-talk. Consider the three sentences:

i) The apple over there is red.
ii) The apple over there looks red.
iii) It looks as though there were a red apple over there.

Utterances of these sentences can express the same responsive disposition to report the presence of a red apple, but they endorse (take responsibility for the inferential consequences of) different parts of that claim. (i) endorses both the existence of the apple, and its quality of redness. (ii) endorses only the existence of the apple. The 'looks' locution explicitly cancels the qualitative commitment or endorsement. (iii) explicitly cancels both the existential and the qualitative endorsements. Thus, if someone claims that there is in fact no apple over there, he is asserting something incompatible with (i) and (ii), but not with (iii). If he denies that there is anything red over there, he asserts something incompatible with (i), but not with (ii) or (iii). Sellars' account of the practice of using 'looks', in terms of the withholding of endorsement when one suspects systematic error in one's responsive dispositions, can account for the difference in scope of endorsement that (i)-(iii) exhibit. But how could that difference be accounted for on a sense datum approach?

Can also make sense of third-person attributions of lookings, where S thought he saw but *I* claim it was a mere appearance: “It merely looked to S as though Φ.”
I *attribute* the claim, and I *withhold* endorsement. (I could also attribute withholding, if S used ‘looks’)

Concession: There are other uses of ‘looks’: After the eye-doctor’s appointment, everything looked blurry. Blurry is not a way things can be.

d) Epistemological lesson: **‘looks Φ’-talk is pragmatically, and so semantically dependent on (presupposes) ‘is Φ’-talk.**
For you cannot *withhold* an endorsement that you cannot *make*.
Conclusion: knowledge of appearances cannot serve as an epistemological foundation (regress-stopper w/res to justification).

The incorrigibility of ‘looks’, ‘appears’, or ‘seems’ claims is epistemologically trivial.
You can’t be wrong because you have not really made a claim (endorsed a content).
All you have done is acknowledge a temptation to make a claim—a temptation you explicitly resist.
That is the reason for the datum behind Descartes’s ingenious theory: why you can’t be wrong about how things appear.
It is *not* because there are things, *appearings*, about which one is infallible.

It is because in making ‘appears’ statements one is not committing oneself to anything.

Connect this with a turning on its head of Descartes: incorrigibility is a trivial side-effect of the fact that one withholds endorsement.

This counter-Cartesian argument by Sellars, too, is brilliant philosophy.

As to the phenomenalist foundationalist definitional and justificatory project of explaining ‘is Φ’ in terms of ‘looks Φ’:

> " We thus see that x is red ⇔ x looks red to standard observers in standard conditions is a necessary truth not because the right-hand side is the definition of “x is red,” but because "standard conditions" means condition in which things look what they are.

It is true by the definition of ‘standard conditions.’

e) Here is a final confirmatory lagniappe:

From perception to agency: analogical argument for language-exit transitions and volitions as minimal safe doings.

Also for agentives: *trying* vs. *doing*.

Cartesian account is of tryings as minimal doings, but safe, because they are indefeasible: one cannot merely *try* to *try* to A, but one *can* merely *try* to A. *Failure* is impossible for these minimal, safe *doings*, as *error* is impossible for lookings, conceived as minimal, safe *knowings*.

But ‘tries’ talk just acknowledges aim to A, while withholding endorsement of *success* involved in avowing an *intention*.

As one acknowledges inclination to commit doxastically, while withholding endorsement of *correctness* involved in avowing belief.

4. <u>Part 4: Epistemology of observation reports. The role of reliability</u>.

Epistemology of observation reports (noninferentially acquired beliefs)
Key here is interface between and relations between:

i. Causal-dispositional issues, such as reliability
ii. Normative issues of belief and justification, including the role of *beliefs* about reliability: Sellars, first-personal and me, second-or-third-personal.
iii.
a) Evading the original Agrippan epistemological trilemma for justification by the default-and-challenge structure.
b) Reliability and reliabilism.
c) For transition to (6): But if to be justified in a noninferentially acquired belief one must not only *be* reliable but *take* yourself to be reliable (believe it, believe it justifiably, believe it truly, or know it), how can one get into the game of having noninferential beliefs in the first place?

32. The picture we get is that of there being two *ultimate* modes of credibility: (1) The intrinsic credibility of analytic sentences, which accrues to tokens as being tokens of such a type; (2) the credibility of such tokens as "express observations," a credibility which flows from tokens to types.

35. An overt or covert token of "This is green" in the presence of a green item is a *Konstatierung* and expresses observational knowledge if and only if it is a manifestation of a tendency to produce overt or covert tokens of "This is green" -- given a certain set -- if and only if a green object is being looked at in standard conditions. Clearly on this interpretation the occurrence of such tokens of "This is green" would be "following a rule" only in the sense that they are instances of a uniformity, a uniformity differing from the lightning-thunder case in that it is an acquired causal characteristic of the language user. Clearly the above suggestion, which corresponds to the "thermometer view" criticized by Professor Price, and which we have already rejected, won't do as it stands. Let us see, however, if it cannot be revised to fit the criteria I have been using for "expressing observational knowledge."

The first hurdle to be jumped concerns the ***authority*** which, as I have emphasized, a sentence token must have in order that it may be said to express knowledge. Clearly, **on this account the only thing that can remotely be supposed to constitute such authority is the fact that one can infer the presence of a green object from the fact that someone makes this report**. As we have already noticed, the correctness of a report does not have to be construed as the rightness of an *action*. A report can be correct as being an instance of a general mode of behavior which, in a given linguistic community, it is reasonable to sanction and support.

The second hurdle is, however, the decisive one. For we have seen that to be the expression of knowledge, a report must not only have authority, this authority must *in some sense* be recognized by the person whose report it is. **…[F] or a *Konstatierung* "This is green" to "express observational knowledge," not only must it be a *symptom* or *sign* of the presence of a green object in standard conditions, but the perceiver must know that tokens of "This is green" *are* symptoms of the presence of green objects in conditions which are standard for visual perception.**

This requirement is going to raise the spectre of a regress (Part 5):
How can I know this *before* I can make reports of (be aware of) green things?

Internalism and Externalism about k.
Sellars's justificatory internalism.
Reliabilism as externalism.
My *via media*, and reliability.
Reliability inferences.
Two senses of foundationalism: epistemological, yes; semantic, no. (Compare: 2 senses of 'noninferential'.)
Reminder of Agrippan trilemma—and its three versions from last time.
Analysis of "looks" talk addresses the Cartesian semantic regress of representation.
We can address the epistemological version with a default-and-challenge social structure of authority and entitlement. In this connection, discuss positive justificatory status = entitlement vs. activity of justifying (transferring or transmitting entitlement) by the activity of justifying. This is the ing/ed ambiguity helping us with foundationalism. Also the iterated quantifier objection to finding a *class* of beliefs that are foundational (Mike Williams and my FSWS). This is a crucial part of the wholesale, default-and-challenge token belief (commitment) by token belief (believing).

Sellars's view is internalist. It contrasts with externalist reliabilism.
Problems with each: McD criticizes Sellars for modeling first-person on second- or third-person.
I criticize reliabilism for thinking it can do away with the "space of implications" appealed to in justification, in favor of "reliable belief-forming processes."
My social account of reliability inferences is the *via media*.
It explains how dispositions can become conceptualized.
Sellars also thinks noninferentially elicited believ*ings* admit a special kind of justification: namely by invocation of one's own *reliability*. (That thesis is what triggers-motivates-justifies Sellars's addressing the issue of how one can *acquire* such beliefs in one's own reliability, along with the concepts whose application one is reliable about.) John thinks that is too third-person a point of view. It ignores a first-personal invocation of one's knowing that one *sees* (which should not be denied simply because one might falsely believe one knows when one does not actually know. The fact that one can't infallibly tell when one knows—can falsely merely *believe* that one *knows*—does *not* mean that when one *does* know one *knows* that one knows. This is a subtle version of the KK thesis. It is tied up with McDowell's treatment of the argument from illusion, and his idea that one can have "mock thoughts"—not only that one might be mistaken about the contents of one's thought, having one demonstrative thought when one thought one was having a different one, but can even be mistaken in thinking one *has* a demonstrative thought, when what one *has* is not really a thought at all: one just sometimes can't tell the difference between having a demonstrative thought and not having one.

Justificatory internalism, externalism, Sellars on reliability. Reliabilism. Simonelli on hyperinferentialism..

Sellars: Can allow that empirical knowledge has an *epistemological*, *justificatory* foundation, in the sense that all justification of empirical claims bottoms out in observation reports, which are, as token*ings*, not inferentially elicited.
But it is crucial to recognize that **this *justificatory foundation* is *not semantically autonomous***.
Making non-inferentially elicited observation reports is not a language-game one could play though one could play no other.
For noninferentially elicited observation reports to be conceptually contenful, and so to be able to serve as premises in reasoning, they must be inferentially articulated. They must stand in inferential relations to other claimables.
So to make such reports, one must also be able to make inferences. And the conclusions of those inferences will *not* be noninferentially elicited observation reports.

The essence of mythical Givenness is the idea of believ*ings* that, because they are noninferentially elicited, are therefore graspable apart from the inferential connections of the what is believ*ed*—the believ*ables*—to *other* believables.

5. <u>Part 5: Acquiring concepts. Coming into the language</u>.

Passage: [q]Instead of getting a concept of something by noticing it, noticing it already requires having the concept.[q] Mere differential response does not require this.

[W]e now recognize that instead of coming to have a concept of something because we have noticed that sort of thing, to have the ability to notice a sort of thing is already to have the concept of that sort of thing, and cannot account for it. **[45]**

This requirement will hold *whatever* one is observing/noticing/sapiently aware of, whether it is inner or outer.

§37: Thus, all that the view I am defending requires is that **no tokening by S *now* of "This is green" is to count as "expressing observational knowledge" unless it is also correct to say of S that he *now* knows the appropriate fact of the form *X is a reliable symptom of Y*, namely that (and again I oversimplify) utterances of "This is green" are reliable indicators of the presence of green objects in standard conditions of perception.** And while the correctness of this statement about Jones requires that Jones could *now* cite prior particular facts as evidence for the idea that these utterances *are* reliable indicators, it requires only that it is correct to say that Jones *now* knows, thus remembers, that these particular facts *did* obtain. It does not require that it be correct to say that at the time these facts did obtain he *then knew* them to obtain. And the regress disappears.

2-ply notion of observation.

This bit, too, turns on the normative/non-normative distinction.
What one must learn is characterizable in causal-dispositional terms.
The entry into normative space, though, is social. It does not happen between your ears.
Sellars' via media in (4) requires one to know one is reliable in order to make noninferential reports. How can that be? Must have the concept to notice: Coming into the language. (It doesn't happen between your ears, but in your status in the community.)
18 month-old saying "Daddy, the house is on fire," and 4 year-old saying it.
Signatures by those just before their 21st birthday and those just after it have very different effects on normative status—in this case, legal obligations.

Must have the concept to notice: Coming into the language. (It doesn't happen between your ears, but in your status in the community.)

Coming into language, the light dawning slowly over the whole. The shift in social status (attributing normative significance) that comes with greater competence.
Signatures and legal majorities.

Will be two cases:
I have discussed individuals coming into an always-already-up-and-running discursive enterprise.
Q: But now we can ask, what about the community? How did *it* cross the boundary from more complex responsiveness, with position-entry transitions, position-position moves, and position-exit transitions to a genuinely *normative* constellation of practices?
A: LW and McD: "the light dawns slowly over the whole," here, as for individuals.
Me, well, OK, but in both cases the difference social-perspectival: in how someone *treats* the candidate. In the social-phylogenetic case of the dawn of linguistic practices, it is a matter of *our* interpretation, how *we* do or would treat them. I think there is something like a discourse-ethical—in Habermas's sense—obligation that if we *can* treat them as discursive, we *should*. But a lot turns on what the 'can' means. I don't want Dennett's lectern in there, or even a whole lot of them.

Concept acquisition. Second punchline is the story about acquiring concepts, coming into the language, how one can get the concept of <u>green</u> if one can't (apperceptively, conceptually, sapiently) notice green things--be aware of them in that sense, but only in the sense of differential response—until one has the concept.
Social functionalism about concept possession: eighteen-month old and four-year old.
Signatures.
Attitudes instituting statuses, and insight of modernity.
In my view there are basically two (or "a variety of") broadly naturalistic approaches to normativity: this social attitudes to statuses view (as filled-in recognitively and recollectively in *ASoT*) and teleosemantic selectional accounts. (But Gibsonian story, as a third alternative?)
Ontogenetic, and then phylogenetic.